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ntario’s former premier, Mike Harris,  saw himself as a no-
nonsense kind of guy, a straight shooter. He was fond of talking 
about “a promise made” being “a promise kept.” In mid-
December 2001, having announced his retirement several weeks before, he was 
perhaps looking for proof positive that he had kept his 1995 promise to privatize 
something. He was, after all, the leader of a neo-liberal government firmly 
committed to the market and the good works that flow from it.  
 In late 2001 Harris finally did something decisive about Ontario’s 
electricity system. He made two important decisions. One was expected, but the 
other was more of a surprise. The surprise announcement was that Hydro One, 
the huge transmission company that had been created with the unbundling of 
the old Ontario Hydro, would be sold to the private sector. It would be the 
biggest privatization in Canadian history, and the proceeds would go towards 
paying off the debt left over from the manic nuke-building spree. As it turned 
out, over $100 million in commissions and fees would line the pockets of Bay 
Street (Canada’s Wall Street) brokers whose companies would handle the Initial 
Public Offering (IPO).  
 A few days later Harris was in front of the cameras again. After four 
years of meetings and uncountable millions of public dollars being spent, he had 
an announcement to make. The market would finally work its magic for 
Ontario’s electricity system, starting on May 1, 2002. The outgoing premier 
sounded a reassuring note. “Nothing,” he promised, “is going to go wrong.” 
 There were few guardians defending public power – that is, until a man 
wearing a top hat and a swallowtail coat threw a big, old-fashioned switch at the 
corner of Queen Street and University Avenue. This prominent spot on the broad 
boulevard leading to the Ontario legislature is where a statue to Sir Adam Beck 
stands. Beck was the populist politician who, a hundred years before, had 
spearheaded the public power movement that had defeated the Big Interests that 
had clamoured for control of electricity at the turn of the century. Beck had been 
the architect of Ontario Hydro, the huge public utility that helped to spearhead 
the industrialization of Canada’s largest province. “Hydro,” as it was called, 
symbolized a dirigiste strain of Canadian capitalism. And it had long provided 
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reliable, cheap power to the province, whose farmers got electricity long before 
farmers south of the border.  
 The Adam Beck photo opportunity was staged in front of the memorial to 
the Hydro founder just before Premier Harris revealed his privatization and 
market-opening decisions. It was intended to launch a new organization called 
the Ontario Electricity Coalition. Standing in front of a giant light bulb 
emblazoned with the slogan “Save Public Power at Cost,” Paul Kahnert laid out 
the left’s argument: there is no way private power can be cheaper than power 
from a public utility because private firms need a profit, which would inevitably 
get added onto utility bills. Early in a campaign that the Coalition promised 
would reach into every corner of the province, Kahnert, a Toronto Hydro line-
crew foreman, showed he could make a sharp point. Privatizing the generators 
and wires that had cost the public so much money was silly, he said. He pointed 
to a line item called “Debt Retirement Charge” that was now appearing on every 
power bill. “Does it make sense to be paying the debt on assets we no longer 
own?” he asked. 
 Such critics had a major problem: they had to position themselves as 
supporters of public power without seeming to defend the old Ontario Hydro. 
The former state monopoly’s public-power-at-cost imperative had long been 
criticized – particularly by environmentalists – as far too costly in ways that went 
beyond Hydro’s balance sheet or customers’ bills. The broader costs included 
acidified lakes, deadly nuclear waste, and global climate chaos. The trade union 
movement had never been onside with the green movement’s anti-nuke 
campaign in good measure because the Power Workers’ Union (PWU) held a 
virtual veto over any official labour backing of traditional anti-Hydro (read, anti-
nuke) campaigns. But by this time the PWU –Local 1000 of the Canadian Union 
of Public Employees (CUPE) – had blotted its copybook with labour by 
supporting the hated Harris government’s privatization policies in the electricity 
sector. CUPE 1000's leaders seemed to feel that the change was inevitable and 
that they could get the best deal for their members by co-operating with the 
government. 
 In doing so, the union local was increasingly out of step with important 
parts of the labour movement. Environmental and labour activists had recently 
gained practical experience working together, not only during the fight against 
the government’s attack on social programs, but also on cancer prevention 
campaigns, the issue of banning cosmetic pesticides, and “just transition” 
programs to compensate and retrain individual workers if environmental rules 
brought job loss. In a politically important departure from developments south 
of the border, Canada’s labour movement stood with environmentalists in 
calling for the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, with the 
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union (CEP) leading the charge. 
One reason the energy industry’s massive campaign against Kyoto in 2001-02 
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flopped was because of its failure to frighten its own employees. The workers 
could not be persuaded that their bosses were being anything but selfish and 
short-sighted. 
 CUPE as a whole was, not surprisingly, especially adamant about 
protecting public services and public-service jobs and had started to put money 
into the Ontario Electricity Coalition and its campaign. When Kahnert helped 
launch the campaign against Ontario’s privatization enterprise, he was holding a 
hand-lettered sign with the headline “Deregulation?” Under it were five capital 
letters: Electricity Nightmare Ripoff, Ontario Next? 
 As a result of OEC campaigning in the months that followed and an 
attack from the social democrats’ New Democratic Party (NDP) on Tory 
electricity policy (along with fallout from the Enron scandal and the evidence of 
the California deregulation disaster) a total of forty-two municipal governments 
– from Galway-Cavendish & Harvey Township and New Liskeard to Toronto 
and Ottawa – followed suit, with resolutions opposing either the Hydro One 
privatization or deregulation or both. The Ontario Electricity Coalition was 
starting to tell itself that dressing its campaign up in a top hat and using the 
unlikely symbol of the capitalist who put an end to gouging by private power 
companies just might pay off. It had, at least at the start, seemed like a too-
little/too-late effort because the privatization express had built up too much 
momentum. 
 The Ontario Electricity Coalition had its start when Charlene Mueller and 
Paul Kahnert decided that if no one else was going to organize against the 
wholesale restructuring of Ontario’s public power system, they would. The two 
Toronto Hydro workers put two years of volunteer labour into organizing 
opposition to what they viewed as a threat to electricity workers and the public 
at large. They were not professional lobbyists, nor did they have any contacts in 
the corridors of power. They had no lawyers, at least at first. What they did have 
was the backing of their union local, an organization with attitudes and 
traditions much different from those of the union representing workers at the 
provincially owned power companies. 
 Kahnert, an avid martial arts practitioner and motorcyclist, became active 
in union affairs in 1983, when his co-worker Neil Morrison fell off a sixty-five-
foot pole. The other crew members tried to keep Morrison alive with CPR, but he 
was too badly mangled. The next day, when Toronto Hydro wanted the crew to 
return to work, the men were not impressed. Electrical utility workers tend to be 
a militant group, proud of their skills, well-organized and reluctant to kow-tow 
to orders they regard as foolish or arbitrary. “We’d seen the most horrible thing 
you can imagine happen to a good friend and they just didn’t give a shit,” 
Kahnert said. “It was like a chicken had died.” 
 The path to activism was different for Mueller. As a member of Local 1 of 
CUPE she had attended only a handful of meetings before finding herself, in 
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1988, in a non-traditional job. There she was, working as an inspector, a woman 
wearing the same green overalls as the male trades workers. At the time the local 
was wrestling with pay equity, and one of its leaders was a deft organizer and 
talent-spotter named Rob Fairley. He asked Mueller to be on the committee, and 
she slowly immersed herself in union work. She described herself as a Silent Sam 
who took her time, listening and learning about the complexities of union 
politics. 
 The Toronto Hydro workers did not see themselves as “production 
associates” or members of one big company team. They had responded 
sceptically to the alphabet soup of management team-building efforts like Total 
Quality Management and Quality Circles that came at them in the 1990s. They 
were different from their opposite numbers at CUPE 1000, the Power Workers’ 
Union, though their ranks were also thinning. When Toronto Hydro merged 
with other municipal utilities, their numbers declined from 2,300 to 1,300. Still, 
CUPE Local 1 members voted to go on strike four times between 1989 and 1999. 
The 1999 strike was sparked by Toronto Hydro’s argument that the local was 
negotiating its first contract because it was a new union representing not just 
workers in the former Toronto local but also workers in the former boroughs of 
the newly amalgamated city. According to this logic, all the hard-won worker-
friendly language of the contract with the former Toronto Hydro local could be 
scrapped. “They wanted to start with a blank sheet of paper,” Mueller said, 
recalling their victory in the bitter three-week strike that followed. “But we have 
a long history of ‘We’ll fight. No matter what”. 
 By the time the hydro privatization issue came to a head in 2001, the 
Toronto Hydro workers had also learned about running campaigns. When 
management attempted to move most of their work from days to nights, they 
campaigned around the slogan “We are not night creatures.” When the issue of 
contracting out the replacement of Toronto’s streetlights came up, the theme of 
the video and the buttons was “We Light the Streets.” Through it all, CUPE Local 
1 activists became familiar with lobbying politicians and appealing to the public 
at large, picking up on the notion of marketing an issue through catchy slogans. 
 In 2000 Mueller and Kahnert approached Local 1 president Bruno Silano 
with the idea of doing something, anything, about electricity privatization. 
“There was no opposition in the province to the government’s policy,” Mueller 
recalled. “That’s what sparked the fire under our asses.” 
 Silano, relatively new to the job, was nonetheless aware of the success 
that the Power Workers had enjoyed by using the symbol of Niagara Falls during 
their big campaign against privatization in 1995-96. But it was still not an easy 
sell at the CUPE Local 1 executive board. It was one thing to organize around 
problems that had such a direct impact on the membership of one local, and 
quite another to go after a major issue of public policy. Kahnert remembered that 
it had even been difficult to get the board to give a hundred dollars to striking 
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day-care workers: and here he and Mueller were asking for $50,000. They argued 
that Hydro privatization represented a broad threat to workers, comparable to 
contracting out street-lighting or meter-reading. 
 At the executive board meeting Kahnert held up the collective agreement 
and asked, “What is our number one responsibility as a union?” The answer: 
“The negotiation and protection of this agreement. Our work life and our home 
life depend on it. This is the biggest threat to come along in a hundred years.” To 
his surprise, the board agreed to give them the $50,000 – a huge sum for a local of 
1,300 people. 
 In the organizing that followed, Kahnert became the public voice of the 
OEC as the organization gathered support from other union bodies, 
environmentalists, Canadian nationalists, and NDPers. Mueller remained in the 
background, marshalling information, running the website, and organizing the 
details. On one level, it was a typical division of labour. The more talkative 
Kahnert, who had already learned to say “power line persons” instead of 
“linemen,” began to catch himself and apologize if he interrupted when Mueller 
was speaking. When Mueller did speak up, it was with understated passion. 
Later she remembered how, when making the case to get money from the local, 
for the first time in her life she found herself saying things like “We are going to 
win this. Here’s why and that’s why we need your support.” She would argue 
that it was “the right thing to do. We’re being robbed.” 
 Rob Fairley, formerly a CUPE 1 leader and by this time an independent 
consultant, wrote a pamphlet arguing that it was not too late to stop the plans for 
deregulation, that deregulation would not only be unfair to people on fixed 
incomes but also produce economic instability and more pollution. He pointed 
out that twenty-two U.S. states had shelved deregulation plans following the 
California debacle. But his main pitch centred on the issue that would have the 
most political traction. The cartoons by radical pamphleteer Tony Biddle showed 
bug-eyed people in homes, factories, offices, and hospitals staring slack-jawed in 
surprise at pieces of paper labelled “hydro bill.” The OEC distributed half a 
million of the pamphlets starting in January 2002. By that time the Coalition was 
receiving financial support from CUPE’s national office. 
 Acting on the advice of CUPE colleagues who were veterans of the long 
struggle to preserve public-health care, the OEC decided to take its campaign to 
communities where it was easier to get media attention. Kahnert spent the winter 
on the road, addressing gatherings organized by local chapters of the Council of 
Canadians, labour councils, and NDP riding associations. He spoke to fifty-five 
meetings in the four months leading up to market-opening. Kahnert and Mueller 
also convinced environmentalists at Greenpeace and the Toronto Environmental 
Alliance to come out publicly against electricity privatization. The green position 
of conservation and renewables gave the OEC a response to the inevitable 
question, “So if you are against privatization, then what are you for?” Kahnert 
Swift & Stewart   19 
would reply that “Conservation is the fastest, cheapest and cleanest way to deal 
with our electricity crisis. But private power companies have no interest in 
selling less product. They’ve destroyed conservation programs wherever 
deregulation has taken root.” 
 Meanwhile, Ontario NDP leader Howard Hampton had sniffed the 
winds in search of an issue to animate his party’s flagging fortunes. Popular 
disenchantment with the Tory government had been attaching itself to Dalton 
McGuinty’s Liberals, and NDP tacticians figured the Liberals had a wishy-washy 
policy on the Hydro issue. By staking out a clear position in opposition to 
privatized power in a free market, they would benefit from any public wrath 
should the Tory policy go wrong. If that happened the Liberals, who had 
unanimously supported the market-opening enabling legislation and were 
cozying up to the Bay Street privatization industry, would scramble to denounce 
the Tories. At that point the NDP could occupy the high ground by denouncing 
the Liberals as opportunistic wafflers. By 2002 the NDP had painted up a 
campaign-style bus with those two words emblazoned on its side, together with 
pictures of Hampton and various electric appliances. The party even had a 
website, “publicpower.ca.” Despite rumblings of internal discontent that the 
party was investing too much political capital into one issue, Hampton took his 
show on the road. 
 As this was unfolding, the national political leaders of CUPE and CEP 
started to sense that the campaign needed a legal focus. They decided to launch a 
last-minute court challenge to the Hydro One privatization. The decision was 
straightforward enough for Brian Payne and André Foucault of the CEP; even 
though they represented no electricity workers, they saw the privatization 
enterprise as a threat to the public good, transcending the self-interest of 
individual workers or union locals. But for CUPE leaders Judy Darcy and leader 
staffer Morna Ballantyne, things were more complex.  
 One of CUPE’s biggest and richest locals happened to be the unit 
representing Hydro One workers. Local 1000 had always forged a separate 
identity within CUPE, even branding itself –logo and all – as the Power Workers’ 
Union. What’s more, it had decided to get onside with Ontario’s electricity policy 
despite the labour movement’s rock-ribbed opposition to privatization. The PWU 
had initially opposed privatization in a high profile ad campaign just after the 
Harris government was first elected. It had previously attacked Britain’s 
privatization pioneers, one of whose explicit goals was reducing union power; 
British firms had succeeded in eliminating some 66,000 electricity industry jobs 
by 1998. Still, Tory energy minister Jim Wilson had appeared at a union meeting 
and on the cover of the Power Workers’ magazine. John Murphy, the local’s 
president, served on the government’s Electricity Transition Committee. 
 All of that activity caused a domestic dispute within the House of Labour, 
and feelings became even more bitter when Murphy, the architect of the CUPE 
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Local 1000 flip-flop, went over to the other side. By the time of the court 
challenge to Hydro One privatization, Murphy was sitting in a vice-president’s 
chair at Ontario Power Generation. Although no one in a position of authority at 
CUPE was willing to comment officially, many would have agreed with the 
assessment of Jim Stanford, the high-profile economist for the Canadian Auto 
Workers: “There’s nothing new about being a management stooge.” 
 Factory managers who are shrewd enough to spot talented shop stewards 
headed for union leadership positions often hire them as supervisors. “You make 
’em, we take ’em,” is the boss’s approach. Those who change sides are 
particularly valuable to management. They make the best foremen because they 
understand the union culture and exhibit the predictable zeal of the freshly 
converted. So it was with John Murphy; he was soon talking the language of 
partnerships and pragmatism. “If you keep saying you are opposed to change 
but don’t have any alternatives, you are going to get marginalized, and are not 
going to have any opportunity for influence,” he said after defecting to OPG. 
Speaking of the Harris regime, he said, “We have not experienced any 
government that has done such broad consultation with the union on every step 
of the electricity industry restructuring.” 
 The Power Workers remained choirboys for the privatization enterprise 
even after their leader decamped. It was unclear as to what kind of deal had been 
arranged with the government in exchange for the union’s support. What was 
clear was that, aside from the police unions who loved the government’s toss-
em-into-boot-camps line on crime, no other labour group in the province was as 
close to the Tories as was the Power Workers’ Union. Yet despite it all, CUPE’s 
national office was surprised when CUPE 1000 retained counsel to intervene 
against its parent body after CUPE national agreed to go to court with the CEP. 
Relations between the national office and CUPE 1000 were getting frosty.      
 No one on the union side was convinced that they would win in court. It 
was, at best, a long shot. Their argument was that governments that had 
privatized major Crown corporations like CN Rail or Air Canada had passed 
legislation granting themselves the authority to make such a major public policy 
move. Against this background, the unions argued that the legislation that 
divided the former Ontario Hydro into separate companies did not explicitly 
give the government the power to turn around and sell them. For its part, the 
government trotted out the old claim that unions should mind their own 
business with respect to anything that doesn’t directly involve their members. Its 
main case, however, rested on the argument that as the owner of Hydro One’s 
shares it could do whatever it wanted with them. The Power Workers 
predictably avoided their ally’s first argument, but backed the second one. 
 By the time Justice Arthur Gans had heard the competing claims and was 
ready to deliver his judgement, Ernie Eves had won the Tory leadership and 
been sworn in as premier, succeeding Mike Harris. The contending parties 
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gathered on Friday, April 19, 2002, at a courthouse on the broad, flowered 
boulevard of University Avenue, just up the street from the spot where the 
Ontario Electricity Coalition had launched its anti-privatization campaign four 
months earlier at the Adam Beck memorial. 
 “‘Hydro One,’ the corporate name for the new millennium, is one of the 
amoebic offspring of Ontario Hydro created by the Government in 1998,” Justice 
Gans began. “Ontario Hydro was one of the defining characteristics of the 
Province, one with which its residents could identify. . . Its creation and basic 
foundation was the primary reason a knighthood was bestowed upon Sir Adam 
Beck in 1914. His sculpted image stands watch over University Avenue.” 
 Justice Gans’s decision came down in favour of the unions, stating that 
the province did not have the authority to carry out the sale. The result was, of 
course, greeted with euphoria among anti-privatization campaigners, prompting 
them to keep up the pressure and redouble their local efforts to persuade 
municipal councils to pass motions opposing the government’s electricity policy. 
The NDP, which saw it as their issue, peppered the new government with 
embarrassing questions. The Liberals, sniffing blood, also began to focus on the 
Hydro issue. 
 If the opposition was emboldened, the supporters of privatization were 
aghast. Toronto’s Bay Street business class, having been enticed by rumours of a 
further bonanza on a possible $8-billion privatization of OPG, was outraged to 
learn that its hundred-million-dollar payday for the Hydro One deal had been, at 
best, postponed. Their trumpets in the business press reacted with florid 
fulminations about an “ideological cabal of big unions.” The right wing National 
Post’s Terence Corcoran warned that the Hydro One “disaster” was “the first of 
many tests that will test the soggy wet mettle of the new Eves government.” 
Quoting Power Workers’ Union president Don MacKinnon as saying 
(mistakenly) that Hydro One was broke and that “the private sector is the way to 
go,” Corcoran declared, “That’s a union voice the new government should listen 
to.” 
 Even before the court decision, there had been rumblings in the Tory 
ranks. Rumour had it that, unlike Harris, Eves was not willing to make the tough 
choices. The backers of the privatization enterprise knew that the market was 
due to open in ten days time and that the Hydro One privatization was simply 
stalled. It could easily proceed within weeks if the Conservatives passed a quick 
bill empowering the government to go ahead with the IPO. But something had 
happened. As they say in the world of sports, there was a sudden shift in 
momentum. 
 In the end, the fight against the wholesale privatization of what had been 
Ontario Hydro was a significant victory over neo-liberalism. It featured the 
Ontario Electricity Coalition’s grassroots political activity (in which union 
activists played a pivotal role). It also included a legal challenge funded by two 
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unions and a challenge in the legislature and beyond by the NDP, a social 
democratic formation closely allied with the union movement. The success was 
also was related to a tired government without any priority but an election: the 
Conservatives had been in office nearly two full terms, their ideological fervour 
blunted and, in the case of electricity, confounded by the incredible complexity 
of remaking the power system along neoliberal lines.  
 In October, 2003 the Liberal Party under Dalton McGuinty, promising a 
return to public power and regulation, defeated the Eves Conservatives. The 
Hydro file would prove no less thorny for them, as they moved to keep their 
promise to close dirty coal generators, return a modicum of regulation to the 
system and make room for new, private sector generators that they suddenly 
seemed to be counting on to ease a  looming power supply crunch.  
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